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DISCOVERY FROM THE UNITED STATES IN SUITS BETWEEN
PRIVATE LITIGANTS-THE 1958 AMENDMENT OF
THE FEDERAL HOUSEKEEPING STATUTE
LITIGANTS in suits to which the United States is not a party may seek aid
from the 1958 amendment I of the federal "housekeeping" statute 2 in their
attempts to obtain government-held information which, while not privileged,"
may not be divulged by subordinate officials tinder department regulations.
Such information is often contained in records in the custody of subordinates
filed in local offices ;4 and, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, litigants
can cause subpoenas ordering disclosure to be served upon these local officials.'
Executive department heads residing and working in Washington, however,
will ordinarily not be amenable to process of the court where the action is
pending.6 And, although a litigant could initiate collateral proceedings in
the District of Columbia to reach the appropriate department head,7 these
proceedings would not only be inconvenient, costly, and time consuming, bnt
quite possibly fruitless, since it has never been held that a department head can
be compelled to respond to such a subpoena.8 Therefore, unless courts enforce
1. 72 Stat. 547 (1958), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). For the text of the amendment, see
text at note 23 infra.
2. REv. STAT. § 161 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). For the text of the
unamended statute, see text at note 10 infra.
3. This Note will restrict the term "privilege" to rights to withhold information the
disclosure of which the common law or specific statutes deem contrary to the public
interest. "Governmental privilege" thus encompasses such information as military secrets,
e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953); 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1952),
diplomatic secrets, e.g., Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp.
551 (D. Md. 1956), and the identity of informers, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53, 59-61 (1957) ; Henrik Mannerfrid, Inc. v. Teegarden, 23 F.RD. 173, 175-76 (S.D.NY.
1959). See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2374, 2378 (3d ed. 1940). Nondisclosure
based on regulations promulgated under the housekeeping statute has, however, been
referred to as a "privilege" elsewhere. E.g., MCCoRmixc, EVIDENCE § 145 (1954) ; Note,
68 YALE L.J. 1409, 1419 n.47 (1959).
4. Timbers & Cohen, Demands of Litigants for Government Information, 18 U. Pirr.
L. REv. 687, 689 (1957) ; see, e.g., United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462
(1951) (FBI reports) ; Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900) (tax reports) ; cf.
Appeal of the United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 226 F2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955) (SEC
records desired in conjunction with stockholders' derivative suit).
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a), 45(d) (1).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d) (1), 45(e) (1) ; 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff1 45.07,
45.09 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
7. For the proper method of initiating collateral proceedings, see 5 Moonm 1 45.07.
8. Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constituitional Question,
66 YALE L.J. 477, 478 & n.5 (1957). It has been asserted that the President and department
heads are inherently immune from subpoenas-an immunity based upon the Constitution.
See White House Press Release, Aug. 12, 1958 (statement of President Eisenhower),
set out in Hennings, Constitutional Law: The People's Right To Know, 45 A.B.A.J,
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subpoenas issued against subordinates, litigants who need governmental in-
formation will often be left dependent upon voluntary disclosure by a depart-
ment head.9
But permissive legislation, executive regulations, and judicial interpreta-
tion have combined to render these subpoenas unenforceable. Title 5, section
22 of the United States Code-the "housekeeping" statute-provides:
The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the con-
duct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its
business, and the custody, se, and preservation of the records, papers, and
property appertaining to it.10
Pursuant to this statute, heads of executive departments have regularly promul-
gated regulations withdrawing from subordinates all discretion to divulge official
information.:" When a subordinate is ordered by subpoena to allow discovery,
these regulations require him to pass the court order, together with his recom-
mendation as to compliance, through the administrative hierarchy up to the
department head.12 If the latter decides to release the information, the sub-
667 (1959); 20 Ors. AT'y Gm. 557 (1893); 25 Ors. A7rr'Y GFN. 326 (1905); 40 Ops.
ATr'y GaN. 45 (1941); Brownell, Menzorandun dii Separation of Powers, 14 FE. B.J. 73,
74 (1954); Rogers, Constittional Law: The Papers of the Executive Branch, 44
A.B.A.J. 94 (1958); Wolklnson, Demand of Congressional Conlnittces for Executivc
Papers, 10 FE. B.J. 103, 223, 319 (1949) ; 36 B.U.L. Ruv. 118, 121-22 (1956). Other com-
mentators have expressed the view that courts could not or should not force department
heads to release information. See 4 MooRE ff 26.25[5] ; Haydock, Sonic Ezidentiary Prob-
lems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirenents, 61 H/Av. L. Ray. 468, 472-78
(1948) ; Timbers & Cohen, supra note 4, at 714-15; Note, 47 Nw. U.L. RE%. 519, 528-29
(1952). Most commentators, however, have opposed executive immunity from judicial or
congressional demands for information. See, e.g., 8 "VxcesoRE, EvIDmNce § 2378(a) (3d ed.
1940); Berger & Karash, Government inimunnity From Discovery, 59 YA.E L.J. 1451,
1462-64 (1950) ; McAllister, Executive or .tudicial Determination of Privilege of Govern-
mert Documents?, 41 J. Cmx. L. & CamixoLOay 330, 332, 334-35 (1950); Sanford,
Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the Control of Executive
Departments, 3 VAxD. L. Rev. 73, 94-96 (1949); Comment, 18 U. Cn. L. RE%- 122, 127-28
(1950) ; 35 MiNN. L. Ray. 586, 589 (1951).
In a celebrated early case, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall asserted that President Jefferson
was subject to subpoena ad testificandum concerning certain letters. United States v. Burr,
25 Fed. Cas. 187, 190-92 (No. 14694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). But see United States v. Cooper,
25 Fed. Cas. 631, 633 (No. 14865) (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (refusal to issue subpoena against
President Adams). Marshall's assertion in Burr was mooted, however, since President
Jefferson eventually furnished the letters voluntarily. See Berger & Krash, supra at 1456-
60.
9. Voluntary disclosure will be forthcoming in many instances. Timbers & Cohen,
supra note 4, at 708-09.
10. REuv. STAT. § 161 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
11. CRoss, THE PEoPLE's RIGHT To KNow 214-15, 230, 237-42 (1953); Mitchell, Goz-
ermnent Secrecy in Theory md Practice: "Rules and Regulations" as an Autonomous
Screen, 58 CoLtIm. L. REV. 199, 204 (1958).
12. E.g., Order of the Attorney General, 18 Fed. Reg. 1368 (1953).
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poena will be obeyed. If he decides to withhold the information, the subordi-
nate will appear in court and "respectfully decline to produce the records or
information"'13 on the ground that disclosure is prohibited by regulation."
Although refusal to respond to a reasonable subpoena is ordinarily grounds
for a contempt proceeding,' 5 the Supreme Court has interpreted section 22
and regulations promulgated thereunder to immunize from punitive judicial
sanctions subordinate officials subpoenaed in actions between private litigants.
Boske v. Corningore ", and United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen 11 held that
section 22 was constitutional 18 and that nondisclosure regulations were within
the contemplation of the statute.10 Boske and Toithy further held that, since the
subordinates were prevented by valid regulations from obeying court disclosure
orders, they could not be held in contempt. 20 Neither Boske nor Touhy decided
that section 22 confers a statutory privilege or executive immunity upon de-
partment heads to withhold information in an action between private litigants.
They decided only that the courts had supoenaed the wrong man.2 ' Despite
13. Ibid.
14. See United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951) ; Boske v. Com-
ingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900) ; Jackson v. Allen Industries, Inc., 250 F.2d 629 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 972 (1958); Ex parte Sackett, 74 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1935); cf.
Appeal of the United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (1), 45(f) ; Penfield Co. v.
SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947).
When the Government is a party, courts may employ methods of enforcing discovery
orders. When the Government is plaintiff, the action can be dismissed. Mitchell v. Bass,
252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 9 FR.D.
719 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd per curiarn by an equally divided Court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
When the Government is defendant, the introduction of government evidence on certain
points can be prohibited, Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801, 805 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) ; O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948), rced on other grounds
sub norn. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
967 (1950), or the facts can be taken as established against the Government, Rey-
nolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd o'n a finding oj governmcnt
privilege, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953), or any orders can be made in regard to the disposition
of the case which are just, FwD. R. Civ. P. 37(b). But see FE. R. Civ. P. 37(f) (denying
the courts power to assess costs against the Government for unreasonable failure to com-
ply with discovery rules); 55(e) (preventing default judgments against the Government).
In criminal prosecutions, courts have held that the Government can claim privilege only
at the price of dismissal of the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Andolsehek, 142
F2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Beckman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946).
See generally 4 MooRE ff 26.25[6].
16. 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
17. 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
18. 177 U.S. at 468, 469.
19. Id. at 470; 340 U.S. at 468.
20. 177 U.S. at 467, 470; 340 U.S. at 469. But cf. United States v. Hall, 153 F. Supp.
661, 666-67 (W.D. Ky. 1957) (criminal case recognizing Touhy, but nonetheless finding
subordinate in contempt, fining him $1,000, suspending imposition of that sentence, and
continuing case).
21. We find it unnecessary, however, to consider the ultimate reach of the authority
of the Attorney General to refuse to produce at a court's order the government
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this narrow holding, however, the practical effect of these cases would not have
been greater had they expressly ruled that department heads need not respond
to a subpoena.2m Since subordinate officials within a court's jurisdiction cannot
under Boske and Touhy be held in contempt, and since the trial court ordinarily
has no jurisdiction over the department head, discretion as to what information,
if any, will be released lies with the department's chief. Thus, even though
Congress has not specifically authorized nondisclosure and the courts have not
yet sanctioned executive immunity from subpoenas, any information which a
department head does not want released for any reason-evidentiary privilege,
administrative inconvenience, even reluctance to publicize departmental mistakes
-is unavailable to litigants.
In 1958, section 22 was amended to provide: "This section does not author-
ize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of
records to the public."' ' Whether regulations under section 22 will still con-
stitute a defense to contempt is an unsettled question. No apposite cases have
been reported since passage of the amendment and commentators disagree on
its effect. One, for example, advocates a new amendment "authorizing the
issuance of regulations governing discolsure of information by subordinate
agency officials... [to] preserve the rules of the Boske and Totehy cases."'-
Since this writer suggests congressional action to resucitate Boske and Toithy,
he must believe, at least, that the amendment precludes the use of section 22
regulations as a defense to contempt.2 5 On the other hand, the counsel of
papers in his possession, for the case as we understand it raises no question as to
the power of the Attorney General himself to make such a refusal.... The validity
of the superior'e action is in issue only insofar as we must dcternine whether the
Attorney General can validly withdraw fron his subordinates the power to release
department papers.
340 U.S. at 467. (Emphasis added.) See id. at 471 (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
But see United States v. Andolschek, 142 F2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) (dictum) (L. Hand,
J.); cf. Appeal of the United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 226 F.2d 501, 517, 520 (6th
Cir. 1955); Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 1000 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
For discussions of the limits of the Boske and Tduihy holdings, see Bishop, supra note 8,
at 478-79; Mitchell, supra note 11, at 206; Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional
Investigatory Power, 47 CAIF. L. REv. 3, 13-14, 18 (1959).
22. Of course, an actual holding of executive immunity would render nugatory collateral
proceedings instituted in Washington for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over a de-
partment head. But collateral proceedings have apparently not been used by litigants. See
note 8 supra and accompanying text. -
23. 72 Stat. 547 (1958), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958).
24. Carrow, Government Nondisclosure it Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 16
(1958).
25. Mr. Carrow also seems to say that, apart from the question of response to a
subpoena, department heads can no longer issue regulations under 22 dealing with non-
disclosure by subordinates. Ibid. A similar interpretation of Congress' intent appears in
Timbers & Cohen, supra note 4, at 691 n.8. For another view that Boshe is no longer good
law, see Donaldson, New Law May End Privilege on IRS Records, Agent's Testimony, it
Civil Tax Litigation, 10 J. TAxATIoN 38, 39 (1959).
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the House subcommittee responsible for the amendment stated, in an article
published before enactment, that the amendment simply clarifies existing case
law by emphasizing that section 22 confers no authority upon the head of a
department to suppress information.2G Under his view, department heads can
still centralize discretion to deal with discovery requests and thus im-
munize subordinates from contempt.
Faced with an uncooperative subpoenaed subordinate official, a court could
interpret the amendment to permit holding him in contempt. Arguing from
the premise that the amendment's purpose is prohibition of the use of 22 to
withhold or limit the availability of information in any way, a court might
rule that regulations promulgated under 22 which centralize discretion to
disclose in the department head would limit the availability of information
and therefore be unauthorized. Such a ruling would strip Boske and Touhy
of their force; section 22 nondisclosure regulations would no longer shield
subordinates from contempt proceedings. Invalidating nondisclosure regu-
lations would not actually overrule Boske and Touhy, however. These cases
could be interpreted to hold that only validly issued regulations are absolute
defenses to contempt. Since section 22 has been amended, regulations which
would withhold information are no longer valid, and therefore unavailable as
a defense. A portion of the congressional debates conceivably supports this
view.27
Nevertheless, a court determining congressional intent would find that the
weight of legislative history indicates that Congress did not wish to restrict
Boske and Touhy,25 but meant only to halt 22's invocation as the basis for
refusals by department heads to divulge information. The bill's proponents
were concerned with a department's ultimate power to withhold information,
and not with a department head's power over his staff or resistance to subpoenas
by subordinate officials. 29 Congress felt that 22 was being miscited as statutory
authority for nondisclosure, 30 and that department heads refusing to disclose
26. Mitchell, supra note 11, at 207-08; see Schwartz, supra note 21, at 18-19.
27. See 104 CONG. REc. 15695 (1958) (remarks of Senator Johnston).
28. "Those decisions [Boske and Touhy] which, in my opinion, correctly interpret title
5, United States Code, section 22, would not be affected at all by the amendment. They
would remain the lav of the land." Id. at 15695 (remarks of Senator Johnston, quoting
Dr. Harold L. Cross). (Emphasis added.)
29. For example, in response to a charge that the amendment might be interpreted
to deny department heads power to regulate the manner in which subordinates handled
requests for information, the subcommittee's chief counsel stated categorically that the
amendment would not "overrule or change in any way the two major decisions of Boske
and Touhy." Hearings on Availability of Information From Federal Departments and
Agencies Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 11, at 2558-59 (1957).
30. Now, why do we seek to amend this particular section of the law? ... The answer
is very simple. The Special Public Information Subcommittee ... in conducting
a study on the whole problem of Government information ... submitted a question-
naire to all agencies of the Government ....
One of the questions in this . . .questionnaire ... was "By what authority do
[Vol. 69: 452
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should be forced to rely specifically on privilege or immunity.3 ' Thus, since
Congress enacted the amendment simply as insurance--"wholly consistent
with the Supreme Court decisions on the subject" 3 -- against employment of
22 to clothe a department head with ultimate authority to withhold information,
a court would probably conclude that his right to centralize discretion in himself
was untouched and that regulations under 22 continue to immunize subordinate
officials from contempt.
It is not the purpose of [the amendment] . . . to affect the decision in
Touhy v. Ragen. Insofar as [the amendment] ... is concerned, the hold-
ing in that case would remain the law of the land, since [the amendment]
... goes only to the authority of the department head himself, and seeks
to make it clear that section [22] ... does not authorize executive depart-
ment heads to withhold information. . ..
Moreover, the amendment fails to effect any practical clianges.- Since the
trial court will ordinarily not have jurisdiction over the department head,
you claim or do you exercise the right to withhold information?" .. . And, we find
section 22, title 5, . . . was cited as legal authority by the [Departments] . . . of
Agriculture, . . . Commerce, . . . Defense [etc.] ....
104 CONG. REc. 6559 (1958) (remarks of Representative Fascell).
The reason the language is added that it is not authority for withholding is that
in 3 years of careful study we have found far too many instances where executive
departments have relied upon this statute as a clear authority to refuse information
to the public or to the Congress itself.
Id. at 6572 (remarks of Representative Moss).
31. If they want to claim a privilege, let them claim it, either under the Executive
privilege or under the specific statute of Congress, but let us not permit them
to use a statute which does not have this intent and never had that intent.
Id. at 6560 (remarks of Representative Fascell). The amendment proponents did not
concede, however, that executive immunity exists. Id. at 6572 (exchange between Repre-
sentatives Moss and Johansen).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 1461, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (195S). For the amendment to
have been wholly consistent with Boske and Touhy, it must be directed to the question
not decided by those cases-the ultimate authority of a department head to withhold in-
formation under 22.
33. 104 CoNG. REc. 15689 (1958) (letter from Senator Hennings, Chairman of the
Senate Committee, to Senator Russel). "To whatever extent section [22] . . . now
authorizes ... the head of any of the ... executive departments to prescribe regulations
instructing his employees to refer requests for certain information to him for decision,
such authority will remain unchanged by the proposed amendment." Id. at 15695 (remarks
of Senator Johnston).
34. Although the amendment will prevent the Executive from citing 22.as authority for
nondisclosure to Congress, see note 30 supra, it will not meaningfully alter the relationship
between the Executive and Congress. Underlying any citation of 22 is the Eixecutive's
claim of "inherent" executive immunity. See note 8 supra. This fact is pointed up by the
novelty that would be presented if executive withholding of information from Congress
were ultimately based on a statute; "what Congress hath given, Congress can take away."
Bishop, supra note 8, at 478-80. In addition, the amendment does not convert the statute
into a positive declaration of the right of individuals or newspapers to information. In
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what authority he relies on to withhold information will continue to be insu-
lated from adjudication; as a practical matter, the amendment will not force
him to rely on privilege or immunity. 5
Insulation of official information from compulsory process, left intact by
the 1958 legislation, is particularly unsatisfactory since executive departments
are unlikely to exercise voluntary disclosure in a manner conducive to thorough
discovery. Information should be readily discoverable unless imperatives exist
which outweigh the benefits deriving from trials conducted in the light of all rele-
vant facts.30 Such a balancing of competing interests 31 requires impartial analysis
and is inherently a judicial function.3 8 When a request for information reaches
the absence of such a statute, it is extremely doubtful that the courts will enforce such an
alleged right-despite its purported origin in the Constitution or Declaration of Inde-
pendence. See United States ex rel. Stowell v. Deming, 19 F2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 531 (1927); Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the
Right To Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 13-22 (1957). Nor
will the amendment substantially affect suits to which the Government is a party, since
when the Government brings suit or allows itself to be sued, it waives any right of lon-
disclosure based on the housekeeping statute. See, e.g., Fleming v. Bernardi, I F.R.D.
624 (N.D. Ohio 1941) (Government plaintiff); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203
(E.D.N.Y. 1949) (Government defendant). But departments have continued to invoke §
22. The amendment might therefore have the effect of causing them, when engaged in
litigation and desiring to withhold information, to cease relying on this statute. See
Mitchell v. Roma, 22 F.R.D. 217 (E.D. Pa. 1958), rev'd, 265 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1959), in
which section 22, relied upon below by the Secretary of Labor before the pagsage of the
amendment, was abandoned on appeal, subsequent to the enactment of the amendment, as
authority for nondisclosure.
The amendment, characterized by the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Govern-
ment Information as a "timid first step," 104 CONG. Rc. 6550 (1958), does have the
virtue of signifying an aroused attitude on the part of Congress in regard to executive
disclosure. In addition, the subcommittee has been instrumental in the passage of other
statutes which are "steps" (if not giant ones) in the right direction. See INT. Rsv. CoDE
OF 1954, § 6104 (requirement that information which serves as a basis for granting tax
exempt status be made public) ; National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, § 303, 72
Stat. 433, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2454 (Supp. 1958) (with certain exceptions, the new National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Agency must make public information "obtained
or developed by the Administrator in the performance of his functions. . . ."). For a
detailed discussion of the subcommittee's purpose and accomplishments, see STAFF or
HOUSE SUBcoMM. ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 85TH CONG., 2D SEss., FRE M OF
INFORMATION LEGISLATION DURING THE 85TH CONGRESS (Comm. Print 1958).
35. Thus, at least in the context of discovery against the Government by litigants in
private law suits, Congress's intent will be defeated. See 104 CONG. Rc. 6564 (1958)
(Representative Moss: "I hope that it will require the departments of Government merely
to cite appropriate legal authority for the withholdings.").
36. See McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937)
8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2192, 2197, 2285 (3d ed. 1940); McCouRmcgC, EVIDENCE § 72, at
152 (1954).
37. Cf. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (informer privilege).
38. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2379 (3d ed. 1940) ; see United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 8 (1953); Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 231 (S.D. Cal. 1953); United States v. Cotton
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a department head he may well be advised to refuse it,30 and will not have the
time or inclination to make a thorough personal study of the case. These
factors, combined with the knowledge that his decision will normally not be
reviewed, may result in denial. Litigants, therefore, may be barred access to
information which under no rules of evidence could be termed privileged;
administative inconvenience is not a compelling reason to keep courts and
parties from information which may be essential to the just and enlightened
determination of a case.40 The emphasis of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure on broad discovery is based on a policy which makes the inconvenience
suffered by litigants and nonlitigants subpoenaed for information a minor con-
sideration.4 ' This policy loses no force when the required data is in the
possession of an executive department; it could be effectuated in this context
only through new legislation.
A reamendment of section 22 should provide specifically that the house-
keeping statute's grant of rulemaking power may be used by department heads
to centralize in themselves authority to decide whether a subordinate will
Valley Operators Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933, 935
(D. Hawaii 1947), Note, 58 YALE L.J. 993 (1949) ; Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255,
257 (W.D. La. 1950). But see Walling v. Comet Carriers, Inc., 3 F.R.D. 442 (S.D.N.Y.
1944).
39. See Hearings on Availability of Information frout Federal Departments and
Agencies Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1955) (statement of James Reston) ; H.R. REP. 1461,
85 Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 29 (1958) ; 104 CONG. Rm 6551 (1958) (remarks of Representative
Hoffman); 8 IVVIGmoRa, EvIDENCE § 2 37 8a, at 792-93 (3d ed. 1940) ; McAllister, Executive
or Judicial Determination of Privilege of Government Documents, 41 J. Czxn. L & Cwn-
NOLOGY 330, 334 (1950). But see Timbers & Cohen, supra note 4, at 703-09.
40. Berger & Krash, supra note 8, at 1465-66; 35 MiNir. L. Rav. 586, 599 (1951);
cf. Ex parte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915).
41. Rule 45(d) (1) provides for the issuance of subpoenas commanding the production
of "books, papers, documents, or tangible things which constitute or contain evidence
relating to any matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b)."
The only limitations on the scope of such examinations in rule 26(b) are relevance and
privilege. The term privilege, as used therein, has the same meaning as that adopted
in this Note. See note 3 supra; United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953); 4
MooRE 26.22. Inconvenience would not, therefore, constitute "privilege." But under
rule 30(b) the court can "make any... order which justice requires to protect the ...
witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression." And rule 45(b) specifies that
the court can quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive or can
condition its issuance upon the advancement by the moving party of the reasonable costs
of producing the requested records.
For discussion of the purpose of the discovery rules see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495 (1947); 4 MooRE f 26.02; Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition Discca'ery
Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 38 COLum. L. REv. 1179, 1190, 1191, 1436, 1441 (1938); Pike &
Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CHL L. R-v. 297, 301-07 (1938) ; Sunderland,
Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. Rav. 737 (1939).
See generally Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE
L.J. 1132, 1155 (1951).
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comply with a subpoena or resist on grounds of privilege, immunity, undue
burdensomeness, or lack of necessity to the litigant's case. But once such claims
are made and adjudged by the court,42 the new legislation should prevent a
department head from using regulations under 22 to prevent compliance with
a subsequent court order to disclose. 43 Permitting the courts to decide whether
particular information in the possession of executive departments should be
insulated from discovery need not result in indiscriminate governmental dis-
closure or unnecessary administrative inconvenience. To avoid irresponsible
and burdensome inquiries, the court should initially require a litigant to demon-
strate that desired information is unavailable from other sources and essential
to the adequate presentation of his case. 44 In short, the recommended reamend-
42. If a formal claim of evidentiary privilege is made, the court, following the pro-
cedure of United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), would ascertain whether cir-
cumstances are appropriate for invocation of privilege, id. at 8-11. If the basis of the
asserted privilege is of sufficient national concern, the court could uphold the Government's
claim without examination. Ibid. If the claim is based on anything else, the court would
view the information in camera, see e.g., United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.
1944), and make appropriate rulings for the protection of any existing privilege, such as
upholding the right to nondisclosure, see United States v. Reynolds, supra, ordering
partial disclosure, see United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 236 (S.D.
Cal. 1953), or requiring disclosure to the persons immediately affected, United States v.
Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). If the information is not
privileged, contempt proceedings could be held against the subordinate. Due to the unusual
nature of the contempt, sanctions should be limited to fine, which would presumably be
paid by the department, not the individual, rather than imprisonment. Presumably, how-
ever, the fine would be avoided by compliance with the court's order. For discussions of
the purpose and nature of civil contempt, see Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418 (1911) ; In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1902).
43. In the alternative, Congress could provide for nation-wide service of subpoenas
duces tecum against department heads, thus allowing the local courts to obtain jurisdiction
over the official who is actually making the decision.
44. This would entail some change in the procedure now in effect under the federal
rules pertaining to the issuance of subpoenas. Rules 45(a), (d) provide that subpoenas
will be issued by the clerk of the court at the request of a party as a matter of course,
The person served with the subpoena may then move to quash it under the provisions of
,-ule 45(b). Under this procedure, the Government would be forced to go to the expense
of opposing all subpoenas before the moving party showed the relevance of the requested
information or the difficulty he would encounter in attempting to obtain it elsewhere.
Because the Government is in possession of vast stores of information, such a procedure
would lead to unnecessary expense and interference with its functions. See Pike & Fisher,
Discovery Against Federal Administrative Agencies, 56 HAmv. L. REv. 1125, 1130 (1943).
Discovery procedure is flexible and should vary with the equities of each case. See
United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289, 291 (E.D. Pa. 1949). If a subpoena is re-
quested by a party to be issued against the Government, therefore, the provisions of rule
34 should apply-the procedure followed when a litigant attempts to use rule 45 to obtain
documents from an opposing party. Rules 34 and 45 are then considered to be in pari
materia. North v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 10 F.R.D. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1950); 5 Mooau
f 45.05 [2]. Rule 34 provides that a subpoena directed to an opposing party will only be
issued, by order of the court, after a showing of good cause. See Panamusica Venezuela
C.A. v. American Steel Export Co., 16 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Dellameo v. Great
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ment would prevent section 22 from functioning as a source of privilege while
retaining it as authority for intradepartmental administration. It would ordi-
narily compel nondisclosure to be grounded on either executive immunity or
evidentiary privilege and, in their absence, afford litigants in suits to which
the Government is not a party an opportunity to obtain needed information.
Lakes S.S. Co., 9 F.R.D. 77 (N.D. Ohio 1949); G & P Amusement Co. v. Regent
Theatre Co., 9 F.R.D. 721 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (the information requested should be
unavailable from other sources). For the requirement of relevancy, see, e.g., Overby v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1955) (court's order for govern-
ment records held to be too broad, included irrelevant material); State Theatre Co. v.
Tri-States Theatre Corp., 11 F.R.D. 381 (D. Neb. 1951); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). For a detailed discussion of what con-
stitutes good cause see 4 MooRE 1111 34.08.09.
If the subpoena issues, it must designate the records desired with reasonable particu-
larity. Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 143 (1928); Consolidated Rendering Co.
v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 553-54 (1903). See generally Newport, "Designation" as
Used in, Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Discovery and Production
of Documents, 35 IowA L. REv. 422 (1950).
